In light of the changes taking place in European-Israeli relations, and the escalation of the policies practiced by Israel in The West Bank and the Gaza Strip, particularly the use of settlement as a tool to undermine the two-state solution, eliminate the practical possibility of establishing an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and push toward displacement; eleven European countries, foremost among them Britain and France, alongside Canada, have moved toward steps targeting trade linked to Israeli settlements, whether by imposing national restrictions or supporting similar European measures. 1
These steps derive their significance from being issued in the context of a close economic and political relationship between Europe and Israel; the European Union remains Israel’s largest trading partner, accounting in 2025 for about 31.7% of its total trade in goods, while the volume of trade exchange between the two sides reached about €43.3 billion 2Over the years, the European approach has rested on a dual equation combining rejection of settlement and adherence to the two-state solution on the one hand, and the continuation of broad trade and political relations with Israel on the other.
From here, this paper attempts to answer a central question: To what extent does the British decision reflect an actual shift in the trajectory of European-Israeli relations, or does it amount to no more than a symbolic position with limited effect, especially in light of the rise of the right in Britain and Europe? And what opportunities does this change provide for Jordan to build upon it?
Motives of the British Decision and the Political Context
The British decision can be read as the result of a political and legal accumulation that preceded its issuance, not merely as a response to a single field development. Britain found itself facing a growing gap between its declared discourse on respect for international law and adherence to the two-state solution, and the continuation of its relations with Israel without employing practical tools commensurate with that discourse. Thus, the decision reflects an attempt to recalibrate this gap and restore a degree of consistency and credibility in British policy, although it remains within the limits of distinguishing between Israel and the settlements, not within the framework of a comprehensive review of the relationship with Israel.
From this perspective, the decision reflects a British attempt to recalibrate this gap, while at the same time responding to mounting internal pressures, more than it expresses a comprehensive review of the relationship with Israel. The decision also rests on a political trajectory that began about a year ago and coincided with other positions related to recognition of the Palestinian state and differentiation between Israel and the occupied territories. Nevertheless, its actual value remains linked to the speed with which it enters into force and the nature of the tools the British government will use, since lengthy legislative and executive procedures may allow it to be emptied of its substance or kept within the limits of a political message.
Politically, this decision came within a gradual path of recalibrating the British position toward Israel, beginning with recognition of the Palestinian state in September 2025[3], then moving to a level more connected to facts on the ground through a ban on commercial dealings with the settlements. The decision was preceded by increasing pressure within the Labour Party and Parliament, as about 140 Labour MPs demanded a ban on trade with the settlements3, in parallel with the continuing effect of the war on Gaza on the party’s electoral calculations after its previous position cost it the loss of a number of seats to candidates supportive of the Palestinian cause. Thus, the decision came at an intersection between internal party pressure, a change in public opinion trends, and the government’s attempt to maintain the consistency of its position after recognizing the Palestinian state.
At the European level, the decision reflects the resort by Britain, France, Canada, and other countries to action within a limited coalition, in light of the inability to reach a unified position within the European Union on imposing measures on Israel. This gives the decision a political significance that goes beyond its British framework, but at the same time reveals the limits of the European shift; it is still based on the actions of a group of states, not on a collective review of the relationship with Israel.
Here in particular, assessments of the decision are divided between those who see it as a symbolic measure aimed at containing pressures, restoring credibility, and reinforcing internal European interests, and those who consider it a first step in an accumulative path that could impose gradual restrictions on the relationship with Israel.
The British Decision Between Two Views: A Symbolic Step or the Beginning of a Shift?
The Decision as a Symbolic Position with Limited Effect
The first view proceeds from the premise that the importance of the British decision is not commensurate with the level of political and media attention that accompanied its announcement; it primarily targets commercial activities linked to the settlements, which represent a limited part of the overall economic relations between Britain and Israel. Consequently, it is unlikely to generate sufficient economic pressure to push the Israeli government to review its policies in The West Bank or to halt settlement expansion and settler violence.
This reading is reinforced by the separation that the British government is keen to maintain between targeting the settlements and continuing relations with Israel; the decision affirms the continuation of cooperation with Israel within the 1967 borders. While this distinction gives the decision a legal basis linked to the illegality of the settlements, it at the same time limits its ability to influence the Israeli government, which undertakes the protection of the settlement project and provides the political and security cover for its expansion.
The period required for the measures to enter into force also opens a gap between announcement and implementation, and may give the targeted entities time to reorganize their activities or circumvent the new restrictions. Here, challenges emerge regarding the British government’s ability to verify the origin of products and track companies and services linked to the settlements, in light of the overlap between the settlement economy and the Israeli economy.
From this perspective, the decision can be viewed as a calculated response to internal pressures more than as a shift in the relationship with Israel; it allows the British government to restore part of its credibility before public opinion and currents critical of its policy, especially with elections approaching, without bearing the cost of reviewing the broader political, economic, and security relations. Accordingly, the value of the decision remains within the limits of the political message unless it is followed by an expansion of sanctions, a tightening of enforcement mechanisms, and a linkage of relations with Israel to clear measures to halt settlement and displacement.
The decision is not detached from the reshaping of party competition in Britain, amid the declining dominance of the two traditional parties and the rise of both the Reform Party and the Green Party, alongside the continued presence of the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Although the Green Party is not currently competing to form a government, its importance for the Labour Party lies in its ability to attract part of Labour’s progressive base, especially young voters and critics of the government’s position on the war on Gaza. A poll targeting voters who had previously voted for Labour and then moved to other parties showed that 67% of those intending to vote Green considered Labour’s position on Gaza a factor in changing their orientation, while 82% of them believed that taking a tougher stance toward Israel would improve their view of the party4. Thus, the decision can be read partly as an attempt by the Labour Party leadership to regain part of its electoral base and narrow the space for competition that its previous position had opened for the Green Party, alongside its other legal and political motives.
This does not mean that the decision was taken for electoral purposes only, but it indicates that a change in the position toward Israel has become capable of achieving an internal political interest, after continued unconditional support for it became a source of potential electoral loss for the Labour Party.
The Decision as a Political Precedent That Can Be Built Upon
In contrast to the reading that downplays the importance of the decision because of its limited economic effect, another trend argues that its assessment should not be based on the shift it produces in the nature of the tools used against the settlement project. Britain has moved from merely condemning settlement and warning against economic dealings with it to announcing a direct ban on settlement products, and targeting companies and individuals who provide construction, financing, and real estate services linked to its expansion. This represents a transition from a declared political position to measures bearing a legal and executive character, even if their implementation requires time.
The importance of the decision also lies in its entrenchment of the separation between Israel within the 1967 borders and the settlements established in the occupied Palestinian territories. This distinction moves the British position from non-recognition of the legitimacy of the settlements to preventing them from benefiting from economic relations with Britain. It also opens the way for expanding the scope of accountability to include companies and institutions that contribute to financing settlement or providing the services necessary for its continuation, instead of limiting sanctions to settlers directly involved in acts of violence.
The significance of the decision also goes beyond its British framework; it came within an action in which France and Canada participated, and received support from other European countries that announced their readiness to take similar measures. Repetition of this step could turn individual national decisions into a broader trend imposing accumulated restrictions on the settlement economy, especially in light of the difficulty of reaching a unified position within the European Union. Thus, the strength of the decision lies in its ability to spread and turn into a model that other countries may adopt.
The sharp Israeli reaction reinforces this reading; Israel responded by closing the British consulate in Jerusalem5 and taking other diplomatic measures against London. It can be inferred from this that Israeli concern is not related only to direct economic losses, but rather to the possibility that the decision will constitute a political and legal precedent that expands the circle of sanctions, increases the isolation of the settlement project, and moves dealing with it from the level of condemnation to the level of imposing consequences.
Accordingly, this trend does not see the decision as a complete transformation in British-Israeli relations, but rather as a first step within a path that began with recognition of the Palestinian state, passed through sanctions on some settlers and Israeli ministers, and reached the targeting of trade and services linked to the settlements. The importance of this path remains linked to its ability to continue, expand, and turn into an institutional policy that is difficult to reverse with changes in governments.
Implications of the Decision and Opportunities for Jordanian Building Upon It
The British decision carries particular importance for Jordan, not only because of its direct economic effect on the settlements, but because it opens a space for re-presenting settlement and displacement as a source of threat to regional security, not merely as violations occurring inside the occupied Palestinian territories. Settlement expansion, the E1 project, and settler violence do not only undermine the two-state solution; they also push toward producing an environment that expels Palestinians, placing Jordan before a continuing threat related to the possibility that displacement may move from a gradual path inside The West Bank to direct demographic and political pressure on its borders and national interests.
From this standpoint, the Jordanian position can deal with the decision as a political window capable of development. In its current form, the decision does not provide a sufficient guarantee to prevent settlement or displacement, but it breaks the state of stagnation that has surrounded European positions, and partially moves dealing with the settlements from the level of condemnation to the level of imposing restrictions. The Jordanian interest lies in expanding this transition and turning it into a more regular European path, instead of leaving it as a limited initiative that can be reversed or obstructed.
From here, Jordan can frame this decision as a possible result of an integrated path that begins with land confiscation and settlement expansion, passes through the fragmentation of geographic contiguity and the weakening of Palestinian institutions, and ends with the creation of conditions that push the population to leave. This linkage helps move the issue into the sphere of European interests by clarifying its potential repercussions for the stability of Jordan and the region, and for the security and political interests of the European states themselves.
At the diplomatic level, Jordan can build on the group of countries that have taken more advanced positions, foremost among them Britain and France, instead of waiting for a consensus to form within the European Union. Working with a limited coalition of countries close in their positions allows the development of steps that can later be expanded, and gradual pressure on hesitant states. Jordan can also employ its bilateral relations with these countries to push toward including settlement and displacement as a fixed item in political dialogues, so that discussion of the issue is not limited to statements issued when attacks occur or new settlement projects are announced.
In parallel with pressure on Israeli policies, Jordan can push toward the adoption of a European path that supports Palestinians remaining on their land, especially in the areas most exposed to settlement and displacement. This includes funding infrastructure, housing, and basic services projects, providing legal support for communities threatened with eviction and demolition, and strengthening the ability of Palestinian institutions to continue providing services. Confronting displacement requires addressing the gradual tools that make Palestinians’ remaining more difficult.
The possibilities of the rise of the right and changes in European governments also require Jordan to expand its circle of contacts beyond existing governments. Sustaining the current positions requires building relations with parliaments and political parties, alongside research centers, unions, rights institutions, and the media. The importance of this path lies in turning rejection of settlement and displacement into an institutional and societal position that does not change completely with changes in governments or shifts in electoral calculations.
Accordingly, the opportunity available to Jordan lies in using this decision as an entry point to form an accumulative European path that narrows the space for settlement and displacement. The success of this depends on Jordan’s ability to move from a position of warning to proactive diplomacy that identifies the required measures, builds alliances to implement them, and links the continuation of Israeli policies to clear political, economic, and legal consequences. Although this path will not completely eliminate the threat of displacement, it may contribute to reducing its possibilities, strengthening Palestinian steadfastness, and preventing it from being treated as an option that can be imposed without regional and international consequences.